

# Change is Not the Same as Progress: The Failures of the McGovern-Fraser Reforms in 1972

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The 1968 election was a disaster for the Democratic Party. Although Democrat Hubert Humphrey lost to Republican Richard Nixon by only a narrow margin in the presidential election, 1968 would be remembered for the many setbacks and conflicts that beset the Democrats. The most damaging event was the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, which left the party in disarray. The country witnessed angry anti-war Democrats protesting in the streets while Mayor Richard Daley ordered violent police tactics to stop the protests. Inside the convention hall, tensions ran high as party leaders nominated Humphrey, who didn't win, or even enter, a single primary. The result was a split within the party. In response to the upheaval, Democrats created a commission to suggest improvements to the nomination process. The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection—better known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission—issued its final report, entitled *Mandate for Reform*, in November 1969.<sup>1</sup> The report offered guidelines for improving the delegate selection process by increasing uniformity in the process and giving greater influence to minorities.

While most historians and Democrats agree that some sort of change was needed for 1972, the success of the McGovern-Fraser Commission and its reforms have been debated since its report was first released. It is true, as veteran political scientist David Truman states, that the changes implemented for the 1972 election process exceeded many Democrats' expectations and resulted in significant improvement when compared to the disastrous events of 1968.<sup>2</sup> Most notably, as Steven Schier articulates, the reforms decreased discrimination and increased the opportunity for participation in the nomination process.<sup>3</sup> However, despite these relative successes, the McGovern-Fraser Com-

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mission was not nearly successful enough in its attempt to solve the problems of 1968 or improve the state of the Democratic Party. First, the reforms failed to improve representation of average voters and citizens. James Lingle and Byron Schafer contend the primary election methods varied too much and the final tallies did not always reflect voter opinions.<sup>4</sup> And political scientist Jeane Kirkpatrick argues that the increase in minority delegates at the 1972 convention had little effect on representing minority concerns.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, the reforms failed to unite the Democratic Party. In 1972 there were still many divisions between factions, especially old party regulars and new delegates, according to John Soule and Wilma McGrath.<sup>6</sup> Finally, some of the recommended reforms were too controversial and too underdeveloped. George McGovern and fellow reformers were forced to compromise at the 1972 convention and save many of their reforms for future conventions. And later reform commissions found it necessary to make significant improvements to the original McGovern-Fraser reforms.

### Relative Success Through Broader Participation

The reforms proposed by the McGovern-Fraser Commission were not a complete failure. Political scientists David B. Truman and Byron E. Shafer both separately refer to the changes as “revolutionary,” while William Mayer calls them “an extraordinary success.”<sup>7</sup> Many political scientists and Democrats believe the rule changes played a crucial role in drastically improving the 1972 convention, relative to the 1968 convention. First, the reforms gave more common citizens an opportunity to participate and influence the presidential nomination, as the party became more anti-establishment. Secondly, the reforms successfully increased minority participation.

Throughout the twentieth century, party regulars were primarily responsible for selecting their party’s presidential nominee. The McGovern-Fraser Commission changed that by giving rank-and-file citizens a greater voice in the nomination process. In *Mandate for Reform* the commission members outlawed the unit rule,<sup>8</sup> forbade proxy voting, discouraged the influence of favorite sons, eliminated fees, and forced states to choose their delegates within the calendar year of the national convention.<sup>9</sup> Potential delegates now had to compete and lobby for

support from Democratic voters and activists. According to Truman, these new rules succeeded because state party leaders did not resist the commission or its changes.<sup>10</sup> Instead, they reluctantly accepted their diminished power by “bowing out of the presidential nominating game” and accepting the larger number of nomination primaries.<sup>11</sup> Only 49 percent of delegates were selected by primaries in 1968, but after the McGovern-Fraser reforms 66 percent of the 1972 delegates were chosen through a primary process, indicating the commission’s changes were successful in opening up the party to broader participation.<sup>12</sup> The restructured primaries put the focus and emphasis on Democratic voters rather than on party leaders. McGovern himself described these primaries as “the most open political process in our national history,” because the reforms “let the people in.”<sup>13</sup> As a result, more unknown delegates were sent to the July convention in Miami. Approximately 90 percent of the New York delegation consisted of people who were essentially unknown in the world of politics.<sup>14</sup> Within the entire convention about two-thirds of the delegates had never been elected to any sort of public office and therefore were considered ordinary people.<sup>15</sup> These statistics demonstrate that the McGovern-Fraser Commission was successful in producing more opportunities for all Democrats to participate in the process.

The Democratic reforms also made substantial progress in increasing the number of minority delegates, and thereby decreasing discrimination within the party. In 1968, women comprised only 13 percent of the convention and blacks 5.5 percent. The reforms implemented during the following four years increased those numbers to 38 percent and 15 percent, respectively. In addition, in 1968 only 11 percent of the delegates were under the age of 30, as opposed to 27 percent in 1972.<sup>16</sup> But it wasn’t just numbers that evidenced greater participation by minorities. At the convention women made their voices heard by playing an active role. They supported an abortion rights proposal, they passed a plank supporting women’s rights, and some held important leadership roles, such as floor manager.<sup>17</sup> The McGovern-Fraser Commission was successful in opening up the political process to women, blacks, and the young. Its reforms allowed for “inclusion in the democratic process.”<sup>18</sup> This increase in minority delegates better reflected the national population. A *New York Times* article written on July 12, 1972

confirmed this. It stated, “‘The convention floor is going to look like the country, or almost like the country, for the very first time,’ [said female delegate Gloria Steinem] and she has been proven right.”<sup>19</sup> Despite initial skepticism from state leaders, the rule changes successfully gave common citizens, who had never before felt heard, a unique opportunity to directly participate in the nomination process. Will D. Davis of Texas, a one-time skeptic who was also in charge of organizing his state’s delegates, conceded in June of 1972 that the reforms were a vast improvement from the old ways and that they did in fact work.<sup>20</sup> Shafer agrees to an extent, as he states that the wide encompassing reforms were “successful,” despite being “notably incomplete.”<sup>21</sup> The chairman of the Democratic Party in New York, Joseph F. Crangle, also summed it up well when he told the *New York Times*, “The McGovern reforms ‘are in the long run very healthy for the party.’”<sup>22</sup>

### Not Representative

The key words in that last sentence are “in the long run,” because despite the advances in broader participation, the 1972 convention did not represent the opinions of common voters significantly better. Political scientist Kirkpatrick emphasizes the difference between participation and representation, and acknowledges that the McGovern-Fraser Commission only set out to increase participation.<sup>23</sup> While the new rules increased participation, they did not increase representation, in part because the changes were limited to benefit only a select, limited group of minorities. And the minority individuals that did go to the convention for the first time in 1972 did not always represent their demographic. The 1972 convention also failed to represent voters properly because there were various types of primaries, which produced inconsistent results that didn’t always reflect the wishes of the voters.

There was still not complete representation at the 1972 convention because the reforms focused too heavily on increasing a select group of minorities. In *Mandate For Reform*, the McGovern-Fraser Commission called for minority delegates “‘in reasonable relationship to the group’s presence in the population of the state.’”<sup>24</sup> However, at the 1972 convention the number of women, black, and young delegates did not match their respective populations. While there were a large number of

black and young delegates, there were still significantly fewer women.<sup>25</sup> These results are proof that the states had failed to fully comply with the guidelines in *Mandate for Reform*. In addition, the commission's reforms were not successful because they only mentioned women, blacks and the young when referring to minorities. Why did the McGovern-Fraser Commission only feel it was important to give women, blacks, and younger voters more representation? If the young got more delegates, why didn't the old? Or why not include all minorities? The reforms also failed to produce an increase in delegates from a variety of socioeconomic groups. For example, only 27 percent of the total Democratic delegation made less than \$10,000 a year, while about 33 percent were classified as wealthy, making over \$25,000 a year.<sup>26</sup> These numbers were not in reasonable relationship to the country's population, because the 1970 census estimated that 70 percent of the country made less than \$10,000 a year.<sup>27</sup> If the McGovern-Fraser Commission had truly wanted to reflect the makeup of the country on the convention floor, 70 percent of the delegates should have had an income of less than \$10,000. Based on these statistics we reach the conclusion that the poor were not adequately represented at the 1972 convention. Similarly, while only 11 percent of the country had a college degree in 1970, 52 percent of the 1972 Democratic delegates had a college degree.<sup>28</sup> Some may argue that having more educated representatives is beneficial; however, this disproportionate number of the well educated did not represent the country. It seems the McGovern-Fraser Commission only partially followed through with its goal, as it selectively chose who it felt was worthy of more delegates.<sup>29</sup> And in fact some of the groups it chose did not take full advantage of their opportunity. Ken Bode, the McGovern-Fraser Commission's former research director, observed that people under 30 were not very involved throughout the process and blacks were hesitant to spend money or resources in order to elect possible delegates. The commission should have found a way to get the younger voters more interested, and they should have allocated funds for the lower-income delegates. If the commission truly wanted to give everyone in the country a greater voice at the convention, it should have called for more participation from all types of minorities. Instead it was left with "a hodgepodge of representative inconsistencies."<sup>30</sup>

The minority individuals that did come to the 1972 convention failed to significantly represent their respective groups. Aside from their diverse appearance, the individuals were very similar to the less diverse delegates of past conventions. Kirkpatrick believes that the McGovern-Fraser Commission only focused on further representing people interested in politics who had strong opinions, not common, rank-and-file voters.<sup>31</sup> A *New York Times* article from July of 1972 seemed to agree, as it noted that the fresh group of delegates that was supposedly full of ordinary citizens was still very political.<sup>32</sup> Many of the new minority delegates held the same political views as the white men backing McGovern. Some minorities even voted against policies supported by their own minority groups in favor of policies that reflected their personal political views. This was demonstrated when a number of female McGovern delegates voted “against the Women’s Caucus challenge to the seating of South Carolina, and against a more liberal abortion plank.”<sup>33</sup> It seems as though the McGovern-Fraser Commission incorrectly believed that only women could represent women and only blacks could represent blacks. But as Walter Goodman said in a September 1972 *New York Times* article, “personal qualities are not of overriding significance. [...] [T]he principle of representation by age, sex and complexion is a peculiar cause for liberal reform.”<sup>34</sup> Just because someone is a member of a minority group doesn’t mean that he or she will promote the interests of their respective minority group. The McGovern-Fraser Commission didn’t realize this going in and as a result failed to represent minorities in the way it had intended.

The McGovern-Fraser Commission also did not accomplish its goal of more accurately representing the voters, because there were so many different primary methods used. These varying methods were inconsistent and led to possible misleading results. Lingle and Shafer argue that the primary election rules played too large a role in 1972 because they were at times just as influential in determining the nominee as the voters themselves.<sup>35</sup> In order to comply with the new rules, states chose one of three basic methods to determine which candidate(s) their delegates would vote for: winner-take-all, proportional, and districted. While no specific method necessarily favored a certain candidate, each type led to different results. For example, in Pennsylvania, which used districting rules, Hubert Humphrey won with 93 delegates, while

George Wallace came in fourth with 16 delegates. However, had it been a winner-take-all format Humphrey would have received nearly twice as many delegates. Or had it been a proportional system, Humphrey would only have received 66 delegates and Wallace would have moved up to second place with 40 delegates.<sup>36</sup> Because of these mixed results, it's hard to tell who the people of Pennsylvania really wanted to be the Democratic nominee. The McGovern-Fraser Commission did not adequately repair the primary election system and ignored the opportunity to adopt a clear, more universal method. It was so focused on increasing participation among ordinary people that it did not consider the logistics of the new system and thus failed to improve representation of voters.

#### **An Unsolved Problem: More Divisions Within the Party**

At the 1972 National Democratic Convention, the party was still divided just as it had been at the 1968 convention. The McGovern-Fraser reforms failed to bring fellow Democrats closer together. The convention witnessed power struggles between the new generation of delegates and old party leaders. "McGovern left the 1972 convention with a divided party," that consisted of "two coalitions."<sup>37</sup> It seems the old party structure, with thoughtful party leaders, was more effective in uniting the party than the new arrangement. McGovern's deputy campaign manager, Rick G. Stearns, supported this theory when he stated, after 1972, that the two opposing groups and their disagreements were beginning to threaten the Democrats' very existence.<sup>38</sup>

Many Democratic leaders and party bosses were not pleased with the new party rules and the result was conflict that left the Democrats divided rather than united. In essence, while trying to improve party unity, the commission actually created more division. A large percentage of party leaders were upset that their delegate positions were slowly being taken away from them in favor of less informed common citizens. The Democratic National Committee Chair, Jean Miles Westwood, noted in her autobiography that there were many "power struggles" between supporters of the old ways and the new ways during 1972.<sup>39</sup> The party regulars were offended that after years of hard work and dedication their own party was trying to kick them out. One

manifestation of these frustrations is the decrease in their campaign donations. This can be explained by the change in policy that meant that donors were no longer guaranteed a delegate position in return for their financial support.<sup>40</sup> The unhappy party leaders also displayed their frustrations by opposing many of the policies supported by McGovern and the reformers. Members of the party establishment protested the reform charter that would have shifted power and reorganized the party's structure. To avoid a further split within the party, McGovern agreed to delay a portion of the reforms.<sup>41</sup> But this compromise then divided Democrats even further with some reform advocates disagreeing with McGovern. The New York delegation refused to compromise and walked out of the convention hall in protest.<sup>42</sup> This disagreement among fellow reformers underscores how tensions among Democrats in 1972 were widespread and enormous. It also further illustrates how the McGovern-Fraser Commission was ineffective in its attempt to unify the party.

Perhaps party unity would have been easier to attain if the reforms had not placed quite so much power in the hands of amateur politicians. Inexperienced delegates made up 51 percent of the 1972 Democratic delegation. Soule and McGrath believe that with more party leaders the Democrats would have been able to make smart, strategic choices to unite the party. Throughout history experienced delegates have avoided embracing controversial policies in public in an effort not to offend any voters that could turn out to be important in the general election. On the other hand, political amateurs tend to passionately voice their opinions on policies and take a strong stand regardless of controversy. In addition, new rank-and-file delegates are often more interested in winning the battle for their specific policies than in considering compromise for the good of the entire party. But experienced party leaders tend to look at the big picture and do what's best for the whole party—they have better judgment. Not only are they more willing to compromise, but they are also more focused on a party victory in November. And due to their experience and knowledge, they tend to be better at determining which candidate has the best chance at winning the general election.<sup>43</sup> The new delegates in 1972 lacked this experience and often discovered they were in over their heads due to



the complexities of the system.<sup>44</sup> Dennis Sullivan and his co-authors agree with this logic and concur that a considerable amount of political experience at the convention is necessary in order to be successful as a party.<sup>45</sup> Based on this reasoning, the McGovern-Fraser Commission should not have required such a drastic rise in the number of amateur delegates (women, youth, and other minorities). In hindsight, the commission should have kept more of the experienced party leaders on the convention floor. Unfortunately, it chose to favor the amateurs and as a result its actions were too radical and hurt Democratic unity efforts rather than improving them.

In 1968, the Democrats lost the general election largely due to divisions within the party. Many angry, frustrated Democrats refused to vote for Humphrey due to his controversial nomination and his Vietnam policies. Unfortunately the McGovern-Fraser Commission was not capable of solving these internal conflicts because 1972 had just as much division. Aides to candidate Hubert Humphrey labeled the McGovern-Fraser Commission “a disaster,” and argued the party had become even more divided instead of healed.<sup>46</sup> This lack of unity and progress was clearly evident in the 1972 presidential election when one-third of Democratic voters chose to abandon their party’s nominee, McGovern, and vote for Republican Richard Nixon.<sup>47</sup> In an analysis of this data, George H. Gallup pointed out that this was the largest defection rate in the history of the Democratic Party. So while only 67 percent of registered Democrats voted for McGovern, 95 percent of Republicans stuck with their party and voted for Nixon.<sup>48</sup> Many party regulars even chose to stay home from the polls in an effort to protest McGovern and his reforms.<sup>49</sup> Clearly, the Democratic Party was still significantly divided and unorganized in November of 1972. The effect was another loss in the November election and four more years of a Republican president. This was a strong signal that the commission’s reforms aimed at unifying the party hadn’t worked.

### **Not Done Yet: Reforming the Reforms**

Another sign that the McGovern-Fraser Commission was clearly not successful in accomplishing its intentions was the fact that it failed

to get all of its reforms approved in 1972, and multiple new commissions were established after the 1972 election to improve and refine the Democratic Party reform policies.

At the 1972 Democratic National Convention, reform leaders were forced to compromise with opponents in order to make the changes more popular. Because of this compromise, not all of the initial reforms were passed or implemented during the 1972 election season. As a *New York Times* article described, approval of reforms to determine the future structure and position of the party was dropped by McGovern and delayed two years.<sup>50</sup> The main problem was that the reforms—specifically the minority quotas—were too controversial. While many states did comply with the new reforms, some took short cuts and didn't do a thorough job in implementing the changes.<sup>51</sup> For these reasons, the McGovern-Fraser Commission came up short and didn't accomplish its preliminary goals. Moreover, by making modifications and then by compromising, the advocates for party reform were essentially admitting the current version of the reforms were not ideal and needed to be re-examined. Even McGovern himself admitted this, conceding the reforms “had bucked party orthodoxy and pragmatism excessively.”<sup>52</sup>

The compromise made at the convention created a separate commission to continue work on reforming the party. This commission was called the Democratic Party Commission on New Delegate Selection and Party Structure, but was informally called the Mikulski Commission.<sup>53</sup> It created new rules of its own, as well as made changes to improve the McGovern-Fraser reforms. This indicates that Chairwoman Barbara Mikulski and other party representatives did not feel the McGovern-Fraser Commission had been entirely successful. The Mikulski Commission replaced the extremely controversial McGovern-Fraser minority quotas by implementing an Affirmative Action policy for future party conventions. This new policy encouraged more representation for minority groups, but did not require it or set any specific targets. As a result, the commission subtly allowed some of the excluded party leaders to come back and play an active role. Furthermore, the Mikulski Commission took specific steps to indirectly unite the national party by calling for Mid-Term Conferences to bring

delegates together on yet another occasion to discuss national party policies. It also created the Judicial Council, which was charged with settling intra-party conflicts before they spread. Finally, organization at the regional levels was improved, and two other councils were created to help Democrats throughout the country with their campaign efforts.<sup>54</sup> Each of these steps helped push Democrats closer to becoming a more cohesive group. The Mikulski Commission measures were all new ideas that the McGovern-Fraser Commission had failed to consider. The Mikulski Commission took these actions because it identified lack of party unity as a serious, continuous problem—a clear sign that the earlier McGovern-Fraser reforms had failed. The Mikulski Commission also attempted to repair problems within the primary process to better represent voters. It forbade Winner-Take-All primaries, thereby limiting the chance for inconsistent and vague results, as well as giving all people within each state a greater voice.<sup>55</sup> In addition, it made caucus selection rules significantly more complex and confusing, in an effort to promote more primaries.<sup>56</sup> The McGovern-Fraser Commission was unsuccessful in improving voter representation because its reforms were vague, limited, and uncreative. The fact that all of these additional reforms were deemed necessary by the Mikulski Commission makes it clear that the McGovern-Fraser Commission failed to adequately impose all the necessary reforms for improvement and success.

### **Losers in 1972, But Ultimately Successful**

The most significant failure of the 1972 Democratic reforms is the loss by George McGovern in the general election. The reforms had partly been created to improve the state of the Democratic Party after its loss in the 1968 presidential election. But the reforms failed to produce a victory in November 1972, and the Democrats actually lost by a much larger margin. In fact, the Democrats lost four out of the first five presidential elections under the new rules.<sup>57</sup> Journalist Max Frankel summarized the effects of the reforms, stating the goals of the McGovern-Fraser Commission were “only partly achieved.”<sup>58</sup> Through my research and analysis I have learned that “for every remedy there is probably an ill.”<sup>59</sup> That said, while the McGovern-Fraser reforms were not successful in solving many previous problems or reuniting

the party in 1972, the commission did have a significant impact ultimately. The McGovern-Fraser Commission was one of the first organized groups to investigate and propose noteworthy reforms for the Democratic Party. These reforms would turn out to be the basis for future reforms that were successful in positively affecting the party.<sup>60</sup> The McGovern-Fraser Commission is responsible for many of the rules and procedures that the Democratic Party and the Republican Party use today. For example, President Bill Clinton's campaign was a strong beneficiary of the work done by McGovern and his committee.<sup>61</sup> Therefore, I have learned that while proximate effects of change are not always successful, we must be patient and eventually consider the significance of the ultimate effects. ●

### Notes

1. Senator Fred Harris, the Chairman of the DNC, appointed Senator George McGovern as the chairman of the new Democratic reform committee. Senator Donald M. Fraser took over for McGovern in 1971 when McGovern resigned to run for president. The rest of the committee was also picked by Harris and consisted of various Democratic politicians, strategists, advisors, donors, and important constituencies, such as multiple unions.
2. David B. Truman, "Party Reform, Party Atrophy, and Constitutional Change: Some Reflections," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 99, no. 4 (Winter 1984-1985).
3. Steven E. Schier, "New Rules, New Games: National Party Guidelines and Democratic National Convention Delegate Selection in Iowa and Wisconsin, 1968-1976," *Publius*, vol. 10, no. 3 (Summer 1980).
4. James I. Lingle and Byron E. Shafer, "Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change." *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 70, no. 1 (March 1976).
5. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Representation in the American National Conventions: The Case of 1972," *British Journal of Political Science*, vol. 5, no. 3 (July, 1975).

6. John W. Soule and Wilma E. McGrath, "A Comparative Study of Presidential Nomination Conventions: The Democrats 1968 and 1972," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 19, no. 3 (Aug. 1975).

7. Truman, 637-638; Byron E. Shafer, *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), 4; William G. Mayer, *The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and Presidential Elections* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 11.

8. The unit rule required all of a state's votes go the candidate that a majority of the state's delegates preferred. In other words the state's delegates had to vote as a unit.

9. James M. Perry, *Us & Them: How the Press Covered the 1972 Election* (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1973), 50; Jeffrey J. Volle, *The Political Legacies of Barry Goldwater and George McGovern: Shifting Party Paradigms* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 171.

10. Truman, 638.

11. *Ibid.*, 647.

12. *Ibid.*, 647.

13. George McGovern, "Come Home, America" (Miami, FL, 13 July 1972), in George McGovern, *An American Journey: The Presidential Campaign Speeches of George McGovern* (New York: Random House, 1974), 17, 19.

14. Frank Lynn, "Few N.Y. Leaders To Be Delegates," *New York Times*, July 4, 1972.

15. R. W. Apple, "Delegate Reforms Bring New Types To the Convention," *New York Times*, June 9, 1972.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Nan Robertson, "Democrats Feel Impact of Women's New Power," *New York Times*, July 15, 1972.
18. Volle, 225.
19. Nan Robertson, "Delegates' New Look: A Sparkling Fashion Show All Their Own," *New York Times*, July 12, 1972.
20. R. W. Apple, "Texas Proves that the New Delegate Guidelines Work," *New York Times*, June 16, 1972.
21. Shafer, *Quiet Revolution*, 6.
22. Lynn, "Few N.Y. Leaders."
23. Kirkpatrick, "Representation in the American National Conventions," 275.
24. *Mandate For Reform* quoted in Perry, *Us & Them*, 50.
25. Soule and McGrath, "A Comparative Study," 503.
26. *Ibid.*; Apple, "Delegate Reforms."
27. Soule and McGrath, 503.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Ken Bode, "Can Reform Change the Nature of the 'Beast'?" *New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1972.
30. Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1975), 196.
31. Kirkpatrick, "Representation in the American National Conventions," 275.
32. Warren Weaver, "His Reforms Wrought Some Havoc," *New York Times*, July 2, 1972.

33. Kirkpatrick, "Representation in the American National Conventions," 314n99.
34. Walter Goodman, "The return of the quota system," *New York Times*, Sept. 10, 1972.
35. Lengle and Shafer, "Primary Rules," 30.
36. *Ibid.*, 28.
37. Soule and McGrath, 514; Apple, "Delegate Reforms."
38. Ernest R. May and Janet Fraser, eds., *Campaign '72: The Managers Speak* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 269-270.
39. Jean M. Westwood, *Madame Chair: The Political Autobiography of an Unintentional Pioneer*, ed. Linda Sillitoe (Logan, UT: Utah State University Press, 2007), 94.
40. Lynn, "Few N.Y. Leaders."
41. Marjorie Hunter, "Reform Compromise Averts Floor Battle," *New York Times*, July 13, 1972.
42. Frank Lynn, "New York Walks Out to Protest Reform Delay, Committeemen," *New York Times*, July 14, 1972.
43. Soule and McGrath, 509.
44. Thomas E. Patterson, *Out of Order* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 33-34.
45. Denis G. Sullivan et al., *The Politics of Representation: The Democratic Convention 1972* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 35.
46. Robert S. Anson, *McGovern: A Biography* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 250.

47. George H. Gallup, *The Gallup poll: public opinion, 1972-1977* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1978), 10.
48. Ibid.
49. Sullivan, et al., 129.
50. Hunter.
51. Caroline Arden, *Getting the Donkey Out of the Ditch: The Democratic Party in Search of Itself* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 5.
52. Jules Witcover, *Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency, 1972-1976* (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 129.
53. It became known as the Mikulski Commission because its leader was Baltimore City Councilwoman Barbara A. Mikulski. Mikulski is now a Maryland Senator in the U.S. Congress.
54. John S. Jackson and Robert A. Hitlin, "The Nationalization of the Democratic Party," *The Western Political Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 2 (June 1981), 272-273.
55. Lenge and Shafer, "Primary Rules," 31.
56. Arthur T. Hadley, *The Invisible Primary* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976), 73.
57. Mayer, *The Divided Democrats*, 12.
58. Max Frankel, "It Was an Institution Ripe for Revolution," *New York Times*, July 16, 1972.
59. Thomas R. Marshall, *Presidential Nominations in a Reform Age*, ed. Gerald M. Pomper (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 31.



60. At the first meeting of his reform commission, on March 1, 1969, McGovern said: "When parties have been given the choice of reform or death in the past they have always chosen death. We are going to be the first to live." McGovern turned out to be right, as the foundation of his reforms lived on and are still present today. See Anson, *McGovern: A Biography*, 248.

61. Volle, *The Political Legacies*, 225.

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